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Among country-specific studies on monetary policy frameworks, a study on India would be 
important. This is not only because of the large size of its population or economy, but 
because a few specific features make India a unique case study among countries. Although 
India consistently maintained a democratic form of governance, prior to the 1990s its 
economic framework was largely similar to that of a command and control economy. During 
the past 20 years or so, the Indian economy has oriented itself towards market forces, with a 
healthy rate of GDP growth and a modest rate of inflation. This change had been gradual 
and except for the balance of payments crisis during 1990-91, has come with minor hiccups. 
Given that this period is characterised by frequent financial crises in large parts of the world, 
the Indian experience and the role played by the monetary framework in it can be a valuable 
lesson in preventing financial crises, and also in pacing and sequencing economic reforms. 
The story of economic reforms in India has been discussed in detail by several researchers 
from different perspectives (Joshi and Little (1996); Ahluwalia (2002); Pangariya (2004); 
Rodrik and Subramanian (2004)). Specific aspects like reforms in monetary and financial 
sectors in India and the role played by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in this endeavour 
have also been reviewed in some of these studies. Some reviews, like Reddy (1999), were 
specifically devoted to the financial sector reforms and listed the changes in detail. A few 
studies have also documented the evolution of monetary policy frameworks and taken a view 
on the applicability of specific frameworks in the Indian context (Mohanty and Mitra (1999); 
Kannan (1999); McKibbin and Singh (2000); Jadhav (2003)). Of late, some studies - mostly 
by current and ex central bankers - have begun to take a futuristic look, critically assessing 
the changes and raising issues of concern (Rangarajan (2001); Mohan (2005a,c)). Aspects 
of the past and future of monetary policy in India and the framework under which it operates 
can also be gleaned from the speeches of the RBI management, sometimes on a general 
note (Reddy (2001a, 2005)) and sometimes on more specialised areas like central bank 
independence (Reddy (2001b)) or communication strategies (Mohan (2005b)). Reports of 
different advisory groups appointed by the RBI also summarise the changes in specialised 
areas like transparency in monetary and financial policies (RBI (2000a)), or data 
dissemination (RBI (2001a)). These reports often review country experiences and are 
valuable sources to analyse India’s relative strengths and weaknesses among countries. 
With such a plethora of information, the purpose of this paper is neither to repeat the story of 
Indian financial sector reforms, nor to tell the story of the evolution of its monetary policy 
framework. Although aspects of these will inevitably crop up in what follows, they are 
discussed from the perspective of identifying new lessons on the grey areas of economic 
theory. 
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The paper argues that the Indian experience could be of help in expanding our knowledge on 
two problems. The first relates to the choice of monetary policy strategy by a central bank. In 
the theoretical literature, the choice of monetary policy strategy is often seen as part of an 
optimal control problem (Poole (1970)). The optimal strategy in this problem depends on 
issues like the stability of demand for money and the relative variances of shocks to the real 
and the financial sector. Empirical observations, however, do not match this theory. Central 
banks that swear to different monetary policy strategies have been found to use similar 
instruments and to react to shocks in a similar manner. The puzzle could be resolved either 
by admitting the possibility that central banks do not practice what they preach, or by 
incorporating “closed-loop” strategies in place of “open-loop” ones.
2 These explanations, 
however, do not provide the answer to the question why central banks do make efforts to 
identify their monetary policy strategy in the first place. Citing the example of Germany, 
Hagen (1999) suggested the possibility that monetary strategies are helpful in solving 
internal and external coordination problems for the central bank. A major purpose of this 
paper is to examine whether the Indian experience is consistent with this theory. 
What makes India an especially attractive case to examine the generality of the theory is the 
fact that the monetary policy framework in India has changed twice since the 1980s. The 
paper attempts to show that, from both a theoretical and a cross-country perspective, the 
changes occurred at interesting points. In both cases, the change in monetary policy 
framework in India took place without substantial changes in the RBI Act, so that apparently 
the stated objectives of monetary policy in India remained the same. However, the operating 
environments at those two points in time were sharply different. The first change occurred 
during the heyday of command and control era, while the second took place when the 
so-called first-generation reform in India was near completion. Interestingly, in each case, the 
change occurred at points where it is possible to argue that there was no immediate urgency 
to act. The RBI’s motivation for the change in both cases, therefore, could throw up some 
interesting insights on the central bank’s strategic preferences in diverse conditions. 
The second grey area in literature where the Indian experience could be of additional help is 
in understanding to what extent the monetary policy framework helps in improving economic 
performance. Both country-specific and cross-country experiences do not provide clear 
answers to this problem (Mishkin 1999)). Country-specific studies indicate that switching to 
inflation targeting (IT) has sometimes been followed by a dramatic reduction in inflation. 
However, due to post hoc fallacy, to what extent the change in monetary framework is 
responsible for this reduction is not easy to answer.
3 The general conclusion appears to be 
that both transparency and accountability are crucial to constraining discretionary monetary 
policy so that it produces the desired long-run outcome (Mishkin (1999)). As the details of 
transparency and accountability are difficult to quantify, this is a serious impediment in 
obtaining definitive results. 
The Indian experience might throw up some interesting insights on the role of the monetary 
framework because rather than a dramatic cutoff, the fall in inflation in India had been 
gradual. Among emerging market countries, its performance in containing inflation - 
especially after the adoption of MIA (the multiple indicator approach, see below for details), 
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appears to be good. As India is not a formally declared inflation targeting economy, this 
observation assumes additional importance. A juxtaposition of the Indian versions of 
transparency and accountability to other economies with diverse monetary policy frameworks 
may perhaps extract what aspects of them are essential for better economic performance. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the evolution of the 
monetary policy framework in India. Our special emphasis in this review is on the possible 
motivations that have led Indian policymakers to change the framework twice since the 
1980s, culminating in the MIA. Section 3 examines to what extent the Indian experience can 
extend our knowledge about the role of the monetary policy framework in economic 
performance. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2.  Evolution of the monetary policy framework in India 
The first and most important part of the monetary policy framework in a country is the task 
mandated to the monetary authorities. In a democracy, this task is typically specified in the 
central bank act. It is interesting to note that despite overwhelming changes in the financial 
sector in India, the mandate to the monetary authorities in India mentioned in the Reserve 
Bank of India Act 1934 has remained unchanged. 
Subsection 2.1 discusses specific aspects of this act. In particular, it examines the different 
interpretations of the mandated tasks and their implications for central bank independence 
and transparency of monetary policy in India. Subsection 2.2 briefly reviews the evolution of 
the framework around this act. Subsection 2.3 then compares different aspects of the current 
framework to those of a few benchmark central banks like the Federal Reserve (Fed) or the 
European Central Bank (ECB). 
2.1.  The RBI Act 1934: different interpretations and implications for central bank 
independence and transparency 
The preliminaries of the Reserve Bank of India Act 1934 set the mandated tasks as 
“...to regulate the issue of Bank Notes and keeping of reserves with a view to 
securing monetary stability in India and generally to operate the currency and 
credit system of the country to its advantage.” 
The tasks mandated to the RBI can, however, be interpreted in several ways. In particular, 
the words “monetary stability” may mean both internal and external stability. If it is interpreted 
in the narrow sense of internal stability, then price stability becomes a major objective. If, in 
contrast, the interpretation also includes external stability, financial stability as a whole 
(including price stability) becomes the mandated task. The RBI website interprets the 
objective of the RBI as monetary authority as: “maintaining price stability and ensuring 
adequate flow of credit to productive sectors” (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/ 
AboutusDisplay.aspx#EP1) Alternatively, Rangarajan, one of the main architects of 
economic reforms in India, interprets the objectives as: 
“(1) to maintain a reasonable degree of price stability and (2) to help accelerate 
the rate of economic growth.” (Rangarajan (2001)) 
It may be noted that though the interpretations of the RBI and Rangarajan (2001) are largely 
similar, they are not same. Credit growth in an economy is likely to be positively associated 
with GDP growth, but the strength of association between them may vary over time. In 
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The additional emphasis on credit growth by the RBI gives Indian monetary policy objectives 
a distinct feature that is not typically discussed in standard textbooks.
4 In most cases, 
however, the objective is stated with an additional “for sustaining overall economic growth” 
(Reddy 2005)) or simply “to support growth” (Mohan (2005a), p 1119) in the end. Therefore, 
in a broad sense, the additional monetary policy objective (besides price stability) in India is 
to support or to facilitate GDP growth. 
The relative emphasis on price stability versus growth is, once again, subject to 
interpretation. It is interpreted that the objective would depend on underlying macroeconomic 
conditions. Monetary policy in India, therefore, strives for a “judicious balance between price 
stability and growth” (Reddy 2005)). Reddy (2005), however, observes that due to the 
democratic process of governance in India, the “judicious balance” is heavily tilted towards 
price stability, which, in some ways, amounts to an “informal mandate” to the central bank for 
maintaining an “acceptable” level of inflation. 
An interesting question here is: who sets these objectives? In a democratic framework, the 
power to set the target typically rests with the elected representatives. In monetary policy 
frameworks like IT, this target is revealed to the public in the form of a transparent contract 
between the government and the central bank. In the Indian case, there is no such explicit 
contract. Rather, Section 7 of the RBI Act 1934 stipulates that the central government may 
from time to time give such directions to the Bank as it may, after consultation with the 
governor of the Bank, consider necessary in the public interest. The RBI Act does not 
stipulate that such directions should be in the public domain or should need the approval of 
Parliament (or at least, be put before Parliament). 
Subject to any such directions, clause (2) of Section 7 of the same Act stipulates that all 
other powers on the general superintendence and direction of the affairs and business of the 
Bank shall be entrusted to a central board of directors. The central government, however, 
enjoys wide power to nominate these directors. Further, the duration of office of governors 
and deputy governors is for such terms not exceeding five years as the central government 
may fix while appointing them.
5 They are, however, eligible for reappointment. Further, 
Section 30 of the RBI Act stipulates that if the Bank fails to carry out any of the obligations 
imposed on it or under the RBI Act, the central government may, by notification in the 
Gazette of India, declare the central board to be superseded and may entrust the general 
superintendence and direction of affairs at the Bank to any agency of its choice. When action 
is taken under this section of the act, the central government must, however, submit a full 
report to Parliament within three months from the issue of the notification. 
So far as the autonomy of the central bank is concerned, the RBI had been ranked 
marginally below the median level among a list of 70 countries (Cukierman (1992)). It may be 
noted that this performance was based on the policy framework during the 1980s and 
Cukierman’s list included 21 industrial countries as well. The institutional arrangement, 
therefore, represented a reasonable degree of statutory autonomy in the case of India - at 
least within the group of developing countries whose overall policy framework yielded little 
operational independence to their respective central banks at that time. 
Interestingly, the Advisory Group on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies (2000) 
appointed by the RBI sharply criticised the institutional arrangements on the process of 
monetary policy formulation in the RBI Act. It went so far as to term the act “anachronistic” 
(Para 3.7) and urged the government to make an early move to amend the necessary 
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sections that do not provide for a systematic and transparent setting of the objectives of 
monetary policy. The Group, however, observed that the act provided adequate powers to 
the RBI to use various instruments of monetary policy. 
2.2.  Evolution of the framework 
Until the early 1980s, the Indian economy was virtually a closed one. Prices of a significant 
number of commodities were administered in India at that time. To sustain these prices at a 
steady level, government subsidies were often necessary and this was one of the factors that 
led to a chronic budget deficit. These deficits were either financed through ad hoc treasury 
bills
6 or through indirect borrowings, mostly from nationalised banks. The first led to more or 
less automatic monetisation. Net RBI credit to the government was the dominant factor 
behind reserve money expansion and the consequent expansion in money supply. To control 
the money supply, the RBI had to increase the cash reserve ratio (CRR) from time to time. 
So far as the market borrowing is concerned, to facilitate the process, interest rates were 
administered and were kept at an artifically low level. The entire structure of interest rates 
was complicated and had multiple layers. Thus, the financial markets were highly segmented 
and lacked depth. The administered interest rate regime was an impediment to the use of 
indirect tools like open market operations (OMO). The only way to finance the borrowing 
programme of the government was to increase the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) from time to 
time. The exchange rate was not market-determined and movements of foreign exchange in 
and out of India were tightly regulated. In short, monetary policy in India during this period 
was completely subservient to the fiscal stance of the central government. Figure 1 illustrates 
this point. In Figure 1, the variable CGRMRAT reflects the ratio of net RBI credit to 
government and reserve money, and NFARMRAT reflects that of net foreign assets of RBI 
and reserve money.
7 In Figure 1, the variable CGRMRAT displays an increasing trend 
between the years 1978-79 and 1982-83. In 1984-85, CGRMRAT was nearly unity, at 0.98. 
India’s formal change to “monetary targeting with feedback” in 1985 should be understood 
against this background. The recommendation for the change was made in the Report of the 
Committee to Review the Working of the Monetary System (RBI (1985), popularly known as 
the Chakravarty Committee Report) in 1985. The economic performance of India 
immediately preceding the report is interesting. After the second oil shock in 1979-80, the 
economy was on the path of recovery. In fact, between 1980-81 and 1984-85, the average 
annual GDP growth rate and the rate of inflation in India were 5.6% and 9.2% respectively.
8 
It may be noted that given India’s earlier achievements (especially with respect to its low 
GDP growth rate, often castigated as “the Hindu growth rate”), these figures should be 
considered as good. A crucial question then remains: why was it necessary to change the 
policy stance to monetary targeting (MT) at that point, when evidence of its failure in the 
industrial economies was already known? 
The traditional way of examination as in Poole (1970) would be to look at the stability of 
demand for money and also the relative magnitudes of shocks to the financial and the real 
sector in a country. India’s shift to MT appears to be consistent with this theory. The early 
literature on demand for money in India generally indicated its stability (Vasudevan (1977)). 
At the same time, the administered interest rate structure, the absence of significant 
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8  These figures quoted are not “real-time” figures, but are based on final data prepared later. In the reported 
figures, for GDP, the base year is 1993-94. For inflation rates, the figures up to 1981-82 are with respect to 
1970-71 as base and the same from 1982-83 onwards are with respect to the year 1981-82 as base. BIS Papers No 31  79
 
 
innovations in the financial sector and the lack of large cross-border capital flows ruled out 
large shocks in the financial sector relative to the real sector. Further, studies like Chitre 
(1986) that appeared approximately at the same time pointed out that the money multiplier in 
India could be predicted with a fair degree of accuracy. This stable relationship between the 
operating target of reserve money and the intermediate target of money supply was another 
crucial piece of evidence that led to the adoption of this approach. 
Figure 1 
Movements in net RBI credit to  
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It may be noted that studies based on Germany have pointed out that MT could facilitate 
internal and external coordination problems for the central bank (Hagen (1999)). 
Interestingly, as our earlier discussion reveals, India’s adoption of MT also supports this 
theory. The Chakravarty Committee, in fact, suggested a formal structure of coordination, 
proposing an agreement between the central government and the RBI on the level of 
monetary expansion and the extent of monetisation of the fiscal deficit. It also observed that 
without such coordination, the RBI’s efforts to contain money supply within the limit set by the 
expected increase in output could become impossible. 
The concept of “monetary targeting with feedback” recommended by the Chakravarty 
Committee was also different from traditional MT with fixed monetary growth as a rule. It 
recommended that the targeted monetary growth should be modified based on the 
information available on expected increase in output and a tolerable rate of inflation. Thus 
the monetary policy framework in India between 1985-86 and 1997-98 could broadly be 
classified as a “flexible monetary targeting approach”, with M3 growth as a nominal anchor, 
reserve money as the operating target and bank reserves as the operating instrument 
(Mohan (2005c)). 
It is interesting to note that despite the move towards MT, no specific monetary target in India 
was set during the second half of the 1980s, except for fixing a ceiling linked to the average 
growth of broad money in the previous years (Mohanty and Mitra (1999)). Further, in its early 
years, MT in India was carried out in an environment where the interest rates were also 
administered. Theoretically, as in Poole (1970), combinations of controls on prices and 
quantities can serve as a strategy, but if pursued arbitrarily, such a strategy is fraught with 
danger. India’s initial half-hearted attempt to liberalise interest rates started approximately 
during this period. Freedom was given to banks to fix their own interest rates (subject to 
some restrictions) but it had to be withdrawn, as banks were unable to handle even this 
reform (Rangarajan 2001)). This experience showed that a lot more preparation would be 80  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
needed for gradual deregulation of interest rates. The early attempts at reforms in this area 
failed because necessary reforms in other sectors were not carried out simultaneously 
(Malhotra (1997)). 
Following this, reforms during the late 1980s were devoted to creating an active money 
market. To activate the shorter end of the money market, treasury bills of 182 days’ duration 
were introduced. This period also saw the introduction of financial instruments such as 
certificates of deposit and commercial paper. In addition, the Discount and Finance House of 
India (DFHI) was set up to provide liquidity to these instruments by creating a secondary 
market. 
While these structural changes were going on, the deficit situation in India did not improve. In 
Figure 2, GFD_CEN presents the gross fiscal deficit of the central government, while 
GFD_COM presents the combined figure for the central and the state governments. The 
broken vertical lines indicate the time points of parliamentary elections in India. The 
chronically high fiscal deficit was one of the major causes that led to the balance of payments 
crisis of the Indian economy in 1990-91. To help the government’s borrowing programme, 
the RBI had to increase SLR while to mitigate the deleterious effect on prices, the only 
effective tool it had in its possession was CRR. By the end of the year 1990-91, the CRR and 
the SLR were 15.0% respectively.
9 
Figure 2 
Movements in gross fiscal deficit  
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The balance of payments crisis in 1990-91 shook the Indian economy. Besides the 
mandated objectives, the major challenges were to restore stability as quickly as possible 
and, once that was achieved, to develop and integrate different financial markets and 
increase the competitiveness and efficiency of the financial system. For stabilisation, 
coordination of monetary and fiscal policy was absolutely necessary. Figure 2 reveals a 
sharp fall in gross fiscal deficit (as a percentage of GDP) immediately after the crisis. 
One of the first important financial reforms that India introduced after the balance of 
payments crisis in 1990-91 was to change to a market-determined exchange rate system 
and to introduce current account convertibility in a phased manner. This change was one of 
the striking successes of the early years of economic reforms. The balance of payments 
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crisis was also largely mitigated by the end of 1992-93. The phase from 1993-94 to 1997-98 
(Phase 2), therefore, is the phase where MT was attempted in a comparatively stable 
environment. 
After stabilisation of the balance of payments crisis, the liberalisation of interest rates in India 
gathered momentum. Drawing lessons from the previous experience, the liberalisation 
measures were adopted slowly but steadily, with the idea that the changes in the short-term 
official interest rates would translate towards the longer end through the yield curve, 
facilitating their emergence as effective policy instruments. A significant development in this 
area with far-reaching implications was the reactivation of the Bank Rate, which was linked to 
all other interest rates, including the Reserve Bank’s refinance rate. 
Three other related changes should also be highlighted in this context. First, significant 
changes took place in the Indian capital market during this period, leading to a substantial 
improvement in market capitalisation, liquidity and efficiency of the Indian capital market 
(Misra (1997), Endo (1998)). Second, the agreement between the RBI and the government 
of India to curb monetisation was signed during this period. It was decided to implement the 
agreement in a phased manner over a period of three years. Third, policies began to be 
more and more closed-loop in nature. This was imperative because of the flexible exchange 
rate regime, which required continuous monitoring. A major consequence of this change was 
in transparency and communication strategy, and also in data dissemination. The market-
determined system required transparency and clarity of policy objectives. The RBI’s 
published reports began to change qualitatively around this period, often focusing more on 
cross-country experiences on specific aspects. 
MT was actively and vigorously pursued during this period. MT, even in this period, was, 
however, constrained by the fiscal stance of the government. Further, with the opening-up of 
the economy, increasing capital flows compounded the constraints. The successful 
stabilisation policy and gradual opening-up of the economy with a market-determined 
exchange rate led to huge capital flows. To maintain the monetary target, it was necessary to 
sterilise these flows. This led to changes in the structure of the RBI balance sheet. Figure 1 
depicts these changes. It reveals that from 1990-91, NFARMRAT - except during the year 
1995-96 - increased continuously. Concurrently, with the changes in the administered 
interest rate regime and other consequent financial innovations, the stability of money 
demand in India became a matter of concern. Some of the studies that attempted to examine 
this aspect during the 1990s were Nag and Upadhyay (1993), Jadhav (1994), Arif (1996) and 
Mohanty and Mitra (1999). The Report of the Working Group on Money Supply: Analytics 
and Methodology of Compilation (RBI (1998), popularly known as the Reddy Committee 
Report) in June 1998 also examined this aspect. The evidence from these studies was, at 
best, mixed. 
India’s second change of monetary policy framework to MIA should be understood with this 
background. Once again, the economic performance immediately preceding the change to 
MIA was not bad. After the effective handling of the balance of payments crisis, the economy 
was recovering. During Phase 2 of MT, the average annual rate of inflation and GDP growth 
were 7.6% and 6.6% respectively. Given that the rate of inflation was moderate, the central 
bank’s credibility in maintaining the monetary target was, arguably, not a serious issue. Once 
again, an interesting question is: why did India change its monetary policy framework in 
1998-99? 
As in the earlier case, stability of demand for money (or lack of it) was once again an issue. 
So far as relative sizes of shocks were concerned, in contrast to the early 1980s, market-
friendly policies during the 1990s warranted that, compared to the earlier periods, the sizes 
and frequencies of shocks to the financial system would increase compared to the shocks in 
the real sector. However, a debate on the relative sizes of financial and real sector shocks 
was largely absent during this period. The traditional theory of Poole (1970) could, therefore, 
offer a partial answer to this question. 82  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
So far as the coordination aspect of MT is concerned, it is interesting to note that India’s tryst 
with MT ended almost immediately after the agreement between the government and the 
RBI (to check automatic monetisation within a defined limit) was operationalised. It could be 
argued that the major need was not the monetary target per se, but coordination. When the 
required coordination was achieved, which was earlier considered a necessary precondition 
for MT, a change to other framework became affordable. Figure 1 reveals a clear decreasing 
trend in CGRMRAT approximately from this time. Thus the internal coordination theory also 
offers a partial answer to the change in strategy. 
Rather than predictability of money growth or coordination problems, the key to 
understanding the change in framework perhaps lies in the signalling aspect of policy. The 
RBI wanted to communicate a strong signal to the market that it was changing the way it 
would implement monetary policy. The signal was to prepare the market for a gradual move 
from quantity-based signals to price-based signals. In this context, it is interesting to note that 
the Reddy Committee Report proposed a set of broader monetary measures that were 
supposed to capture the effects of new financial innovations better. However, unlike the US 
case, no attempt was made to shift to alternative monetary measures as targets. 
The change in framework was thus an official recognition of a phase in which monetary 
authorities were constrained to work on both the quantities (money) and the prices (interest 
rates) front, despite its well known limitations. To increase the efficiency of the banking 
sector, further reductions in CRR were necessary. This itself was a constraint that prevented 
a fully fledged change to signal solely through interest rates. Yet, cross-country experiences 
revealed distinct advantages of interest rate signals. It may be noted that while many of the 
necessary reforms in the financial sector were complete or near completion at that stage, the 
necessary operational infrastructure (ie existence of clear corridors for short-term interest 
rates) to impart clear interest rate signals were not fully ready at that time. Due to short 
history, the precise relationships between short-term and long-term interest rates and the 
role of market-determined interest rates in the real sector were also far less understood. The 
move towards price-based signals was primarily motivated by cross-country experience and 
judgment. 
Abandonment of the MT framework, however, required an alternative. India adopted the 
multiple indicator framework. The possible other candidates were exchange rate targeting, 
interest rate targeting and IT. In the Indian context, exchange rate targeting was not 
appropriate due to the relatively closed nature and large size of the economy. Similarly, 
stickiness in long-term rates was a major impediment to considering an interest rate targeting 
framework seriously. IT, in contrast, was a serious option. It is, therefore, relevant to discuss 
why India did not adopt IT at that time. 
The success of many developed and emerging market economies under an IT framework 
was keenly followed in India. While appreciating many advantages of the IT framework, its 
critics raised three major concerns in the Indian context. First, fiscal dominance was 
considered a serious problem. Second, supply shocks and the role played by prices of a few 
crucial administered commodities in overall price formation were perceived as important. 
Lack of an official core inflation measure further compounded the problem. The third and final 
concern was that a move to IT might be too early. Most of the countries that had formally 
adopted IT approach had not completed a full business cycle by that time. Summarising 
these concerns, Kannan (1999), in one such article, suggested a “wait and watch” policy. 
It may be noted that the problems identified by those arguing against the adoption of IT were 
not insurmountable. Fiscal dominance, for example, was also an important factor behind BIS Papers No 31  83
 
 
failures to meet monetary targets.
10 In the Indian case, the problem could have been solved 
by clearly mentioning in the IT contract that if the government’s budget exceeded a certain 
limit, then the RBI would not be held responsible if inflation overshot the target within a stated 
time period. Similarly, the problem of supply shocks could also have been tackled - at least 
initially - by adopting a broader range for the acceptable rate of inflation than that practiced 
by the developed countries. Interestingly, the Advisory Group on Transparency in Monetary 
and Financial Policy suggested formal acceptance of the IT framework approximately at the 
same time. 
Rather than the concerns for fiscal dominance or supply shocks, India’s decision not to adopt 
IT during 1998-99 could perhaps be explained from the political economy angle. In many 
inflation targeting economies, people were fed up with a chronically and persistently high rate 
of inflation and this created an environment that facilitated formal acceptance of that 
framework, especially after its startling success in the first few economies that adopted it. In 
contrast, as inflation in India was moderate all along, the political desire for a major change in 
the framework was conspicuously absent during the late 1990s. The late 1990s was a 
politically volatile period in India, with successive unstable governments. As Figure 2 
demonstrates, three parliamentary elections were held in qick succession during this period. 
To incorporate the radical changes that the IT framework demanded, a fair degree of political 
consensus in India was necessary. 
The transition to MIA was arguably a compromise outcome of monetary policy reforms. This 
approach has been followed since April 1998. In this approach, besides monetary 
aggregates, information pertaining to a range of rates of return in different financial market 
segments along with the movements in currency, credit, the fiscal position, merchandise 
trade, capital flows, the inflation rate, the exchange rate, refinancing and transactions in 
foreign exchange - which are available on a high frequency basis - is juxtaposed with data on 
output and the real sector activity for drawing policy perspectives. In a medium- to long-term 
perspective, the impact of money supply on inflation, however, cannot be ignored and for the 
purposes of policy, the RBI still continues to announce projections of money supply 
compatible with the outlook on GDP growth and expected inflation. It may be noted that 
though India did not formally adopt an IT framework and practiced monetary policies in the 
subsequent period that are by and large discretionary in nature, it attempted to assimilate 
many of its desirable features (especially with respect to transparency) in the MIA. This 
aspect will be reviewed further in Subsection 2.3. 
Since the adoption of the MIA, there have been four major changes. The first related to the 
signalling aspect of monetary policy. The RBI once again undertook the task of creating a 
corridor for the short-term money market rate in a phased manner, finally enabling to carry 
out liquidity management in India through open market operations (OMO) and reverse 
repo/repo operations. 
The second major change was in the evolution of policy coordination, culminating in the 
Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Legislation. The objective of the legislation 
was to impose fiscal discipline on government spending and ensure a transparent and 
accountable fiscal system. 
The third major change was in clearer demarcation of stabilisation policies from structural 
policies. Earlier, major monetary policy announcements in India used to take place twice a 
year. As stabilisation of financial markets often needed quick and immediate action, it was 
repeatedly articulated by the RBI management that necessary policies for that purpose would 
                                                  
10  Failure to meet the monetary target and failure to meet the inflation target would perhaps result in different 
types of credibility problems. For example, internationally, the Bundesbank’s reputation was in controlling 
inflation and not necessarily in maintaining its monetary targets. 84  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
be taken immediately and certainly not after a long wait of six months. This, however, did not 
apply to policies that had long-run structural implications. 
The fourth major change was the result of the changed approach regarding the second and 
the third. It concerned the way these long-run structural aspects were handled. Coordinated 
efforts were necessary to examine and implement international best practices. Along with 
other significant market players and other experts (especially those in the academia), both 
the government of India and the RBI jointly attempted to implement the International 
Financial Standards and Codes. 
2.3.  Multiple indicator approach: the current monetary policy framework 
Although the RBI refers to its current monetary policy framework as the MIA, internationally 
the more familiar term would perhaps be an implicit nominal anchor approach. Abandonment 
of an MT framework implied the loss of broad money (M3) as the nominal anchor. Since 
changing the policy framework, the RBI has not categorically mentioned its nominal anchor. 
Internationally, the limitations of the implicit nominal anchor approach are well known. The 
two central banks that are often benchmarks for the rest of the world, the Federal Reserve 
(Fed) and the ECB, both seem to follow this approach. In both cases, there is overriding 
concern for inflation, though there appears to be no explicit public commitment in the case of 
the United States.
11 In both the United States and the Eurpean Union, the rate of inflation 
thus works like an implicit, but not formally declared nominal anchor. Further, especially in 
case of the United States, its careful monitoring of signs of inflation and forward-looking 
actions under the leadership of Alan Greenspan appear to have yielded excellent results. 
In his review of international experiences with different monetary policy regimes, Mishkin 
(1999) has observed similarity in the forward-looking strategic actions of the Fed with 
inflation targeting economies. Mishkin (1999), however, has severely criticised this approach 
for its lack of transparency, categorising it as a “just do it” approach. He further observed that 
the success in this approach would strongly depend on the preferences, skills and 
trustworthiness of the individuals in charge of the central bank.
12 
The current Indian monetary policy framework looks remarkably similar to the frameworks of 
both the Fed and the ECB in this respect. In the Indian case, though the relative emphasis 
between price stability and growth depends on the underlying macroeconomic conditions, the 
RBI management has publicly acknowledged price stability as being the overriding concern. 
In fact, Reddy (2005) has acknowledged price stability as a kind of “informal mandate”. 
In the MIA framework, the RBI mentions its own projections with respect to the mandated 
tasks in any given year.
13 None of these projections, including that on inflation, are worded 
as “targets”, although that pertaining to the rate of inflation could be thus interpreted by 
economic agents. Apparently, these “projections” are self-imposed and informal. However, 
                                                  
11  The ECB has clarified that its long-term price stability goal should be interpreted as a range for inflation of 
0-2%, but is not willing to call its framework an IT framework. This approach has drawn flak from certain 
quarters. For example, Mishkin (2001) comments “The ECB seems to have decided to try to have its cake and 
eat it too by not committing too strongly to either a monetary or an inflation targeting strategy” (Box 2, p 518, 
Sixth Edition) 
12  Mishkin (2000) wryly observes that “I think it is fair to say that right now the nominal anchor in the United 
States is Alan Greenspan”. 
13  It may be noted that RBI projections include both GDP growth rate and growth in non-bank credit. Thus, its 
projections encompass the various ways the mandated task can be interpreted. It also generally declares in a 
routine fashion that the projected credit growth would be “adequate” for the productive sectors of the 
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given the power of the central government in India, it is imperative that they are set after 
consultations with the elected representatives. 
It may be noted that this form of soft wording that makes the target implicit is not uncommon. 
In its gradual shift towards IT, Chile had followed this approach. Initially, inflation targets were 
announced and worded as official projections, rather than hard targets. However, over time 
as inflation fell, the procedure was changed and inflation targets came to be viewed by the 
central bank and the markets as hard targets. Mishkin (1999) observed a similar approach in 
the case of industrial countries as well. The RBI’s current approach, therefore, looks similar 
to a soft and flexible version of IT. 
A relevant question that occurs here is: how are these projections made in India? Central 
bank projections, in most cases, are initially carried out by the staff members, using different 
statistical or econometric techniques. Results of these models are then combined with the 
judgments of the policymakers. It is difficult to judge from the predicted figures to what extent 
a particular projection has been influenced by the “superiority” of judgment, unless the 
models are publicly disseminated with all relevant data and other related information. In the 
case of India, individual reviews like Barman (2002) have summarised the forecast efforts of 
the RBI staff. However, there is no separate official document like “Economic Models at the 
Reserve Bank of India” à la Bank of England (2000). Rather, these efforts remain scattered 
across official documents. 
The models in central banks, however, could serve an alternative purpose. These models - 
especially the macroeconometric ones - serve as communication channels to explain to 
economic agents the official views on transmission of the monetary policy. In fact, many 
central banks have their own official views on monetary policy transmission process and this 
view is articulated in a separate document, eg, Bank of England (1999). In the case of India, 
once again, the official view remains scattered across documents. 
Among the four traditional channels of monetary policy transmission, common sense 
suggests that the exchange rate channel and the asset prices channel would play a limited 
role in India. The role of the exchange rate channel is limited because of India’s relatively 
closed nature. Though the degree of openness of the Indian economy has increased 
substantially compared to the 1980s, the large size of the domestic market compared to total 
exports or imports suggests that the exchange rate channel may not be an influential 
channel. So far as the asset price channel is concerned, compared to the developed 
economies, the financial system in India has a relatively low vulnerability to asset bubbles. 
There is limited exposure of bank lending to the sensitive sectors, including real estate. The 
share of housing loans in the overall loan portfolio stood at about 10% in March 2004 and net 
non-performing assets were 1.4% of the net outstanding loans as compared with 2.8% of the 
aggregate portfolio (Reddy (2005)). This suggests a limited role for the asset price channel 
as well. 
The major uncertainty on monetary policy transmission in India is, therefore, on the relative 
roles of the quantum channel (especially relating to money supply or credit) and the interest 
rate channel. Earlier, the MT paradigm implicitly took into account the transmission 
mechanism through the credit channel, as implicit in the targeted monetary growth was also 
a credit growth target (Rangarajan (2001)). 
The many macroeconometric models prepared before the adoption of the MIA in India 
(eg Pani (1984); Bhattacharya et al (1994); Rao and Singh (1995)) attempted to study the 
relationships among money, price and output with the implicit recognition of the dominance 
of the credit channel in India. Alternative policy simulations were also tuned to find out the 
optimal rate of money or credit growth in specific circumstances and to what extent the 
changes in CRR would lead the economy to the desired trajectory. This trend was continued 86  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
during the late 1990s (Rangarajan and Mohanty (1997); Palanivel and Klein (1999)).
14 The 
so-called atheoretical vector autoregressive models specified during this period were also not 
exceptions. In the Indian context, Srimany and Samanta (1998) attempted to study the 
interrelationship among money, price and output by specifying a three-variable structural 
VAR model. 
Despite serious attempts, the model-based exercises to understand the transmission 
mechanism were severely constrained in India by the lack of comprehensive and timely 
information in some areas. Conceptually, the entire process of monetary policy transmission 
through the interest rate channel can be divided into four phases. In the first phase, central 
bank policy rates affect the explicit or implicit operating target, often the overnight rate. In the 
next stage, the short-term rates lead to changes in the long-term rates through the yield 
curve. In the third stage, these long-term rates lead to changes in aggregate demand. In the 
fourth stage, interactions of aggregate demand and aggregate supply lead to the 
determination of prices and output. 
In the Indian case, clear evidence is at least available for the first three phases. Successful 
implementation of the corridor for the overnight rates has enabled the RBI to give policy 
signals through official interest rates that form the bounds of the corridor (eg the repo rate). 
The adjustments in the short-term money market rates in response to the policy rates are 
quick and generally take place within a single reserve maintenance period (ie a fortnight). So 
far as the second phase is concerned, studies like Sastry et al (2001) have found evidence 
that despite the stickiness, long-term interest rates (eg lending rates) also begin to change, 
often after a lag of one month. The evidence on the third phase is comparatively recent. 
Panel studies by Prasad and Ghosh (2005a) on corporate behaviour confirm the importance 
of the interest rate channel in the case of India. Further, they highlight that the interest rate 
channel has strengthened considerably post-1998. 
Despite progress in understanding, it is the fourth stage in the transmission channel that still 
leaves many questions unanswered and the paucity of relevant data and information is most 
serious in this case. For example, until the mid-1990s at least, data on GDP in India were 
unavailable at quarterly frequency. Further, estimation of crucial measures such as potential 
output is not easy in the Indian case, notwithstanding some recent efforts. The quality of 
these estimates would improve if more data on the unorganised sector, employment and 
capacity utilisation were available. In this context, a major lacuna in India is that the data on 
employment essentially pertain to the organised sector, which constitutes less than 10% of 
the total labour force. It is important to stress that this is a severe constraint under which 
monetary policy in India is still being carried out.
15 Further, a lack of reliable wage data is an 
impediment in determining the relative roles of cost-push and demand-pull factors in specific 
situations. 
Additionally, an assessment of the inflationary conditions in the economy is constrained by 
the lack of a comprehensive measure of consumer price inflation. The multiple consumer 
price indices in India, on the basis of occupational classification and residence (rural/urban), 
compound the problem, especially when differences in weighting diagrams of the commodity 
baskets lead to differences in inflation numbers. 
To illustrate this aspect, Figure 3 reveals the movements of different price indices in India.
16 
In Figure 3, WPI is the annual rate of inflation based on WPI. AL, UNME and IW are all CPI-
                                                  
14  Krishnamurty (2002) provides a detailed review of the history of macroeconometric modelling in India at least 
until the end of the 1990s. 
15  In RBI official publications, discussions on the labour market are generally conspicuous only by their absence. 
16  Even the determination of real equilibrium interest rates for India may not be easy because of the absence of 
agreement on the price measures to be utilised. BIS Papers No 31  87
 
 
based measures, for agricultural labourers, urban non-manual employees and industrial 
workers respectively. A casual glance at Figure 3 conveys that in any given year, the rates 
could be sharply different. However, Figure 3 suggests that their long-term relationships are 
unlikely to be seriously affected, despite findings to the contrary (Samanta and Mitra (1998)). 
In fact, Figure 3 also suggests that the three- or five-year moving averages of these rates of 
inflation are likely to be closer, as shocks to specific commodity groups are averaged out in 
this process. 
Figure 3 
Different measures of the rate of inflation in India 
 
 
So far as other informational requirements are concerned, it may also be noted that India, 
even at this stage, also lacks a comprehensive service price index. Expectation or outlook 
surveys are also nascent. As a consequence the time series properties of different series 
from these surveys cannot be estimated well. 
As the transmission mechanism is relatively less understood in India, a natural question is: 
how does the RBI decide to make changes in the CRR or the official interest rates in the 
multiple indicator regime? Figure 4 presents the quarterly changes in the Bank Rate (BR) 
and the CRR since the adoption of the MIA and juxtaposes these changes with the rate of 
inflation and GDP growth. Figure 4 reveals a few important features of the Indian economy. 
First, it establishes the “efficiency” compulsion of the Indian policymakers: a typical reduction 
in the BR or the CRR, even during the late 1990s, may not necessarily reflect “easy” 
monetary policy.
17 In fact, there appears to be an asymmetry in the impacts of a CRR (or BR) 
rise and that of a CRR reduction. Given the constraints of the policy authorities, an increase 
in CRR or BR would indicate the monetary authority’s signal of tightening, but relaxing them 
may not be necessarily so. Three instances of an increase in either CRR or BR are shown in 
Figure 3, among which the first, during 1998, was a signal of tightening in the context of the 
                                                  
17  The RBI had repeatedly stressed its long-run commitment of reducing the CRR to the statutory minimum level 
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Southeast Asian financial crisis. It may be noted that in each case, the rate of inflation started 
to change course after about another quarter, despite relaxations of these measures 
afterwards. Given that CRR or Bank Rate changes were often initiated at the beginning of a 
quarter (ie in April or October), Figure 3 seems to suggest that monetary policy measures in 
India typically begin to affect the real sector with a lag of about six months, a lag that is 
generally in tune with cross-country findings. 
Figure 4 
Movements in inflation and output  
and the RBI policy signals 
 
Working with both CRR and BR is a major impediment to having a clear policy reaction 
function in India.
18 In fact, as late as in the year 2000, the RBI (2000b) suggested that a 
consequence of the lack of a clear policy reaction function in India could be that policy rules 
(eg Taylor rule) that could guide discretionary policy of the authorities in stabilising business 
cycles had not emerged in India. Interestingly, the RBI (2002) attempted to rectify this 
problem by specifying a policy reaction function in its model for the Indian economy. 
So far as individual attempts at finding policy rules are concerned, in an interesting study 
Rao (2003) attempted an innovative solution. Generalising the concept of a monetary 
conditions index, Rao proposed a macroeconomic condition index comprising 
10 macroeconomic indicators. He normalised each indicator on a scale of 0 to 1 and took a 
weighted average of these indicators; the weight accorded to each normalised variable was 
the inverse of its standard deviation over the sample period of 1990-91 to 2001-02. Rao’s 
technique, therefore, is similar to that of the principal component analysis in multivariate 
                                                  
18 In  the  Handbook of statistics on Indian economy (13 September 2005), Table 45 (p 96) for Bank Rate, CRR 
and SLR mentions only the effective date of the change. It does not give the date of announcement of the 
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statistics. Rao used this indicator to explain changes in the official interest rates, and thus 
obtained a policy rule for the Indian economy. Given that this rule was based on most of the 
indicators listed by the RBI in the MIA, this is probably the only unofficial attempt to extract 
rules from apparently discretionary policies that characterised the 1990s. 
Given the limitations in understanding the transmission channels and limitations in 
macroeconometric models in a radically changing environment, research, both within and out 
of RBI, often focussed on single equation techniques, especially in case of inflation.
19 Among 
studies in this category, Callen and Chang (1999) attempted to explain and forecast the rate 
of inflation in India by alternative techniques. Their study revealed that among alternative 
indicators, M3 remained an important determinant of inflation. In fact, they observed an 
increase in the information content of the monetary aggregates since the financial 
deregulations. Callen and Chang (1999), however, found that an output gap specification did 
not work well on Indian data. 
Besides limitations in the statistical infrastructure that put severe constraints on modelling 
exercises, three other major differences distinguish the Indian monetary policy framework 
from that of the developed economies. The first difference is the importance of fiscal 
dominance in the Indian context. Figure 2 reveals that in many instances, the variable 
GFD_CEN either peaked or displayed an increasing trend near parliamentary elections, 
highlighting the existence of the classical time-inconsistency problem. Although numerical 
values of GFD_CEN have come down sharply from 1998-99 onwards, its value still hovers 
around 4.0%. The deficits and the consequent borrowing programmes of the government 
puts serious constraints on the RBI’s monetary management. This is because, as the debt 
manager of the government, its monetary and debt management activities could sometimes 
be in conflict. 
The second difference is the predominance of publicly owned financial intermediaries in 
India. Cross holdings and inter-relationships among these organisations could be a problem. 
In the context of central bank independence, Reddy (2001b) had sharply criticised this “joint 
family approach” that “ignores the basic tenets of accounting principles”. 
The third difference is in the operating target. So far as the tactical aspect of monetary policy 
is concerned, the operating target in India has - until now - not been clearly mentioned. 
However, observers of the Indian market would readily verify the increasing inclination of the 
Indian monetary authorities to keep the short-term interest rate within a given corridor, which 
suggests that the call money rate in the Indian market could be taken as an informal 
operating target.
20 
An important question is: how has the Indian framework performed in terms of transparency 
and communication of policy? An international benchmark document in this area is the Code 
of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies prepared by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). This document is a development of the late 1990s. The 
Indian observance of these codes was reviewed by the Advisory Group on Transparency in 
Monetary and Financial Policies. The Group took a holistic approach and, other than a few 
lacunae already mentioned, found India to be compliant with most of these codes. 
The Advisory Group’s major concern was about the apparent lack of transparency in the 
setting of monetary policy objectives. In this context, it must be stressed that, for its part, the 
RBI had clearly mentioned its projections of a few crucial macroeconomic indicators in its 
policy statements. It can be argued that these projections also reflect the policy priorities at a 
certain point of time. 
                                                  
19  Barman (2002) provides a review of the forecasting approach within the RBI. 
20  For example, Hawkins (2005, Table 1, p 60) has characterised the overnight rate in the money market as 
India’s operating target. 90  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
In a typical financial year (from April to March), these projections first appear in the annual 
policy statement. Generally these statements are given by the second half of April or first half 
of May. The projections may be revised in the Mid-Term Review, which typically occurs in the 
second half of October or the first half of November. These reports are lengthy and often 
consist of about 60 pages. As there are no sections devoted to these projections alone, a 
search for them could be tedious unless the concerned person reads at least a few of these 
reports to understand the way they are organised. The projections are made available in the 
part devoted to the monetary policy stance for the coming year. This part (often about two to 
three pages) not only provides the projections but also attempts to explain the rationale 
behind them. To examine the “judicious balance” between the objectives mandated to the 
RBI, one must read this part of the policy statement carefully. 
Besides the projections, the long lists of RBI publications, the frequency of the speeches of 
its top management and its data dissemination appear to be consistent with the international 
standards in general. It may, however, be pointed out that RBI reports and reviews are often 
too long. With such a plethora of information dissemination, the very purpose of information 
dissemination and communication may be lost. For example, the need to prepare a 95-page 
quarterly report (Macroeconomic and Monetary Development 2004-05) can be questioned, 
especially when many other central banks can manage that task within about 60 pages 
(eg  the August 2005 Inflation Report of the Bank of England consists of 59 pages, all-
inclusive).
21 The RBI website, however, appears to be in tune with the international benchmark. 
Given all these, an important question is to what extent the RBI had been able to establish 
credibility. As policies during the 1990s were often discretionary and based on judgment, this 
question becomes crucial in understanding its role in guiding market expectations - a crucial 
feature in an IT framework. The question is also important in the Indian context, because if in 
future the RBI changes its framework to IT, the quality of its own assessments would play a 
significant role. 
In this paper, we attempt to answer this question by examining to what extent the RBI 
outlook had actually materialised. The quality of assessments of the RBI during the MT 
period has already been examined by Mohanty and Mitra (1999). Further, Barman (2002) 
has reviewed the quality of RBI projections of the rate of inflation and GDP growth rates in 
the post-MT period from 1998-99 to 2001-02. The MIA approach, however, is based on 
several indicators. Therefore, it is important to review all RBI projections. In this paper, we 
examine the RBI projections on five variables, viz, the annual rate of inflation and annual 
growth rates of GDP, M3, bank deposits and non-food bank credit from the years 1999-00 to 
2004-05. Table 1 reports the performance of RBI projections for these five variables. 
Table 1 reveals a few important aspects regarding credibility. First, the quality of RBI 
projections had generally been good. If we allow a 2.0 percentage point band on either side, 
the major divergence in case of inflation has occurred only once, in the year 2000-01 when 
the projected rate was about 4.5% whereas the actual turned out to be 7.2%. Its outlook 
regarding the other variables also reflects a moderate to good performance. 
A few general aspects, however, are important to note. First, the projections came at 
different time during the year. Although sufficient advance notice is given to the general 
public for the date of the annual policy statements and also for the mid-term review, so far 
these dates do not follow a clear pattern. For example, in the case of annual policy 
statements, differences in these dates could be as high as one full month (April 20 in 1999-
2000 and May 18 in 2004-05). Hence, the information content that went in these projections 
and the time horizons of these projections were also different for different years. 
                                                  
21  One way to make a brief report is to make available a few background or survey papers on specific areas by 




RBI projections of indicators and actuals 
Financial year (date and 




Real GDP growth  6 to 7  6.1 
Rate of inflation  about 5  3.3 
M3 growth  15.5 to 16.0  14.6 
Growth in aggregate 
deposits 16.5  13.9 
1999-00  
(20 April 1999; paras 35 
and 36) 
Non-food bank credit 
growth  about 18  16.6 
Real GDP growth  6.5 to 7.0  4.4 
Rate of inflation  4.5  7.2 
M3 growth  about 15.0  16.8 
Growth in aggregate 
deposits about  15.5 18.4 
2000-01  
(3 May 2000; para 31) 
Non-food bank credit 
growth  around 16  14.9 
Real GDP growth  6.0 to 6.5  5.8 
Rate of inflation  within 5.0  3.6 
M3 growth  about 14.5  14.1 
Growth in aggregate 
deposits about  14.5 14.6 
2001-02  
(19 April 2001; para 45) 
Non-food bank credit 
growth  16.0 to 17.0  13.6 
Real GDP growth  6.0 to 6.5  4.0 
Rate of inflation  Assumed to be slightly 
lower than 4.0  3.4 
M3 growth  about 14.0  14.7 
Growth in aggregate 
deposits  about 14.0  16.1 
2002-03  
(29 April 2002; para 42) 
Non-food bank credit 
growth  15.0 to 15.5  26.9 
Real GDP growth  about 6.0  8.5 
Rate of inflation  5.0 to 5.5  5.4 
M3 growth  at 14.0  16.7 
Growth in aggregate 
deposits at  14.0  17.5 
2003-04  
(29 April 2003;  
paras 59-61) 
Non-food bank credit 
growth  15.5 to 16.0  18.4 
Real GDP growth  6.5 to 7.0  6.9 
Rate of inflation  around 5  6.4 
M3 growth  at 14.0  12.4 
Growth in aggregate 
deposits at  14.5  13.0 
2004-05  
(18 May 2004;  
paras 57-60) 
Non-food bank credit 
growth  16.0 to 16.5  31.6 
Note: The actual figures for non-food bank credit growth for the years 2002-03 and 2004-05 include the impact 
of mergers and conversion of a non-banking entity to a bank. Hence, they are not comparable to the 
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Second, the wordings of the outlooks do not follow any clear pattern. Sometimes, they are 
point projections, sometimes expressed with clear upper and lower bounds, sometimes with 
only one-sided bounds and sometimes with fuzzy words like “about” or “around”. Therefore, if 
one wants to examine whether the RBI’s projections of specific variables are improving or 
deteriorating over time, there is no easy quantitative measure (eg average absolute error in 
projection) to summarise the performance. 
Third, the projections that provide clear lower and upper bounds appear to be too narrow vis-
à-vis international standards. For example, the range in one-year-ahead forecasts in a fan 
chart provided by many central banks could be higher than the range provided by the RBI, 
despite inflation rates in some of these countries being lower and less volatile. The thin range 
in some of these projections, therefore, could usher in unwarranted credibility problems. 
Fourth, despite moving away from monetary targets, the projections for M3 under MIA 
appear to be good. 
Fifth, the apparently high forecast errors in the case of non-food bank credit growth in the 
years 2002-03 and 2004-05 are due to mergers as well as conversion of a non-banking entity 
to a bank. In this paper, the figures for that variable corresponding to the “Actual” column in 
Table 1 have been taken from Table 230 of the Handbook of statistics on Indian economy 
(13 September 2005) disseminated by the RBI. The notes at the end of the table explain why 
the growth rates in non-food bank credit have suddenly jumped in those years, but 
unfortunately do not mention the comparable figures. 
3.  Performance under different monetary policy frameworks 
Earlier, Mohanty and Mitra (1999)’s review compared the performance of MT to that of earlier 
frameworks. However, being an early study, it could not include observations after the 
adoption of MIA. Further, Mohanty and Mitra (1999) did not distinguish the performance by 
breaking the entire MT period into subperiods. In this section, we attempt to extend their 
findings by focusing on these two tasks. We also attempt to assess the role of monetary 
policy in these changes. Subsection 3.1 examines the performance, while Subsection 3.2 is 
devoted to the second objective. 
3.1.  Performance of the Indian economy under different monetary policy 
frameworks 
In Section 2 it was discussed that the way RBI words its monetary policy objectives makes it 
difficult to judge its performance against a well defined benchmark. This is for at least three 
reasons. First, to arrive at the benchmark for “adequate” credit, one would require an 
accurate estimation of demand for credit in the economy. Second, even if this demand is 
correctly estimated, the cutoff line for “adequate” may still change depending upon one’s 
perception of and aversion to risk.
22 Third, credit extended “to support growth” may have a 
time-varying relationship with GDP growth. The strength of association between the two 
would depend on the efficiency of the banking system, the availability of funds from non-bank 
sources and corporate behaviour in raising finances for projects. Gauging the “adequate” 
level of credit is, therefore, not an easy task. 
                                                  
22  For example, results in Banerjee and Duflo (2004) suggest that during the second half of the 1990s, many 
small firms in India were severely credit constrained. While credit extended in the economy may not be 
“adequate” from these firms’ perspective, the same may not hold from the point of view of the banking sector 
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To illustrate the third point, the time-varying correlation coefficient between GDP growth and 
non-food credit growth is plotted in Figure 5.
23 In Figure 5, NCORR (RCORR) denotes the 
correlation between nominal (real) credit growth and growth in nominal (real) GDP at factor 
cost. The time-varying correlation coefficients have been calculated with a moving window of 
15 years. Thus, the figures pertaining to 1985-86 correspond to correlations between 
variables from 1971-72 to 1985-86. 
Figure 5 
Time-varying correlation between  




































Figure 5 reveals considerable variations in the strength of association between credit growth 
and GDP growth over time in India. Several aspects of the relationship can be gleaned from 
Figure 5. First, there appear to be two periods that experienced a sharp fall in both NCORR 
and RCORR, the first during 1990-92, and the second in 2002-04, as a result of crisis points 
in the ends of the moving window. While these were due to directed lending programmes, 
credit growth did not suffer during these points; other factors led to a sharp fall in GDP 
growth. Second, between 1994-95 and 2001-02, NCORR in Figure 5 is fairly stable, while 
RCORR displays a clear trend. Interestingly, the moving windows during this period do not 
contain any data points from the volatile 1970s. The trend in RCORR during this period 
seems to be consistent with the findings of Rodrik and Subramanian (2004). The pro-
business policies pursued by the government since the early 1980s led to more productive 
use of credit. Third, the sharp fall in NCORR and RCORR after 2001-02 reflects 
measurement problems. During the years 2002-03 and 2004-05, the RBI data on credit 
growth included the impact of a merger as well as conversion of a non-banking entity into a 
banking entity. While ideally one should use data excluding the impact of the merger and the 
conversion to obtain comparable figures for these years, the point that we want to establish 
is the importance of non-banking sources in the demand for funds. Worldwide, the distinction 
between banks and non-banking financial companies became narrower during the 1990s. 
Indian experience is also consistent with this trend. Fourth, the trend in RCORR reflects a 
paradox. Although during the 1970s and 1980s the credit channel was thought to be the only 
effective channel for monetary policy transmission, the inefficiency in the directed lending 
programmes did not necessarily lead to growth. While economic reforms opened up other 
channels, the increased efficiency in the banking sector led to a closer association between 
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credit growth and GDP growth. Fifth, despite the increase in the strength of association, the 
correlation figures are still moderate. The above observations appear to be consistent with 
the findings of Misra (2003), who analysed the relationship between credit off-take and 
growth in 25 states in India from 1980-81 to 2000 and concluded that lack of credit off-take 
should not be seen as a problem in itself, but should be seen in conjunction with what is 
happening on the growth front. 
A broader interpretation of the objectives of monetary policy in India, however, includes price 
stability and GDP growth. We therefore examine performance with respect to these two 
variables. Table 2 presents the summary statistics corresponding to performance in specific 
periods from 1970-71 to 2004-05. For expository purposes, the period 1970-71 to 2004-05 
has been divided into four phases: (i) 1970-71 to 1984-85 (Pre-MT), (ii) 1985-86 to 1992-93 
(MT: Phase 1), (iii) 1993-94 to 1997-98 (MT: Phase 2) and (iv) 1998-99 to 2004-05 (MIA). 
 
Table 2 
Performance under  
different monetary policy frameworks 
Annual average  Standard deviation 
Period 
Inflation GDP  growth Inflation GDP  growth 
Pre-MT (1970-71 to 1984-85)  8.4  3.8  8.0  3.8 
MT (1985-86 to 1997-98)  8.1  5.7  3.0  2.3 
Phase 1 (1985-86 to 1992-93)  8.4  5.2  2.9  2.6 
Phase 2 (1993-94 to 1997-98)  7.6  6.6  3.3  1.2 
MIA (1998-99 to 2004-05)  5.0  6.0  1.6  1.5 
 
Framework-wise, there appears to be a clear picture. Inflation in India has fallen gradually. 
The GDP growth rate has increased and volatilities in both variables have demonstrably 
declined under the MIA. The performance with respect to inflation is all the more noteworthy 
because during the pre-reform period, prices of a lot of commodities were administered. As 
these prices were not market-determined and were often kept steady artificially with budget 
support, the problem of controlling price rises was not relevant. 
Thus, apparently, the MIA in India has served its purpose well. However, before jumping to 
this conclusion, two caveats should be remembered. First, better performance under the later 
framework does not prove that it is the change of the framework or monetary policy alone 
that has caused the better performance. Performance with respect to both inflation and 
growth under a particular framework is the result of many other policies. As monetary policy 
affects the real sector with a long and variable lag, any assessment of a particular policy on 
this performance is likely to suffer from the classical post hoc fallacy. Second, the 
performance comparison should ideally take place in a ceteris paribus condition. For 
example, a major change that could have affected the performance during the MT period is 
the agreement between the central government and the RBI on curbing monetisation. That 
agreement was signed only in 1997, during the last days of MT in India. Similarly, 
comparisons would be meaningful only if supply shocks are comparable across periods. 
Subsection 3.2 examines the role of monetary policy in ushering in these changes further. 
The relative efficacy of frameworks can also be questioned if we break the MT period into 
two phases. During phase 2 of the MT approach, GDP growth had been about 
0.6 percentage point per annum more than that in the MIA. Its volatility is also slightly less 
than that observed in the MIA. The inflation rate, in contrast, is markedly less during MIA. It BIS Papers No 31  95
 
 
has fallen by 2.6 percentage points per annum more and its volatility (measured in terms of 
standard deviation) has also nearly halved compared to the second phase of MT. 
3.2.  role of monetary policy in the observed performance 
We now attempt to assess the role of monetary policy in India in bringing about the changes 
in economic performance. The first question before us is: to what extent is monetary policy 
responsible for the improvement in economic performance? We attempt to answer this 
question by assessing the contribution of shocks other than monetary policy shocks to 
inflation in India. 
The Indian monetary authorities have repeatedly stressed the importance of supply shocks in 
the Indian context. In fact, the perceived dominance of supply shocks was one factor besides 
fiscal dominance that led India not to opt for IT. Among other determinants, the role of supply 
shocks in inflation in India, therefore, needs careful scrutiny. 
The annual rates of inflation observed from 1970-71 onwards seem to confirm the important 
role of supply shocks. From 1970-71, the Indian economy experienced three high inflation 
episodes, viz, 1972-75, 1979-81 and 1990-95, leading to double digit inflation rates.
24 The 
first two episodes were clearly due to the increase in international oil prices that had 
devastating consequences for the Indian economy. Even in the last episode during 1990-95, 
the role of supply factors cannot be ignored. Though fiscal profligacy and the balance of 
payments crisis were responsible for the higher rate of inflation during this episode, one 
incident that triggered the crisis was the Gulf war. 
One way to examine the role of monetary policy would be to examine core inflation rates. In 
the Indian context, though official core estimates are not available, core inflation measures 
have been estimated by Samanta (1999) and Mohanty et al (2000) based on different 
principles.
25 These studies once again confirm the importance of supply shocks in India. 
Core inflation estimated by these studies tended to be lower, especially during high inflation 
episodes. For example, during the high inflation episode of 1990-95, while the average 
annual rate of inflation based on WPI was 10.7%, core inflation measured using a trimmed 
mean approach was 9.9% (Mohanty et al, 2000). So far as the contribution of oil shocks is 
concerned, Bhattacharya and Bhattacharyya (2001) examined the role of oil prices on other 
commodities in a VAR framework. Their results, largely pertaining to the data on the second 
half of the 1990s, revealed that a 20 percentage point shock in domestically administered oil 
prices led to about a 1.3 percentage point price increase in other commodities at its peak, 
which typically occurred five to seven months after the shock. 
Unfortunately, the reference periods in these studies either do not include any observations 
after the adoption of MIA or include only a few. However, the performance of inflation in India 
since 1998-99 seems to further corroborate the importance of supply shocks. If, as per 
Rangarajan (2001), one considers 5.0-6.0% as the tolerable range for inflation in the Indian 
context, there had been two instances where the rate had overshot, eg 7.2% in 2000-01 and 
6.4% in 2004-05. In each case, the increase was due to that in the fuel, power, light and 
lubricants (FPLL) group (28.5% and 10.1% respectively). The average rate of annual inflation 
                                                  
24  The rate of inflation (based on WPI) in the year 1993-94 was 8.4%. 
25  The RBI should prepare a few “official” measures of core inflation. Efforts in this direction so far have come at 
the initiative of individual staff. While the appropriateness of a specific core inflation measure in the Indian 
context may always be questioned, there is no harm in providing more than a single official measure. The 
debate on the appropriateness of a core inflation measure is primarily an empirical one and unless at least a 
few such measures are made available, cannot be resolved satisfactorily. 96  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
in manufactured commodities, a very crude estimate of core inflation based on exclusion 
principles, had been only 3.8% per annum since 1998-99. 
These observations are generally supportive of the importance of supply shocks. Their 
implications being that even if the monetary policy framework in India is changed to formal 
IT, the band of the tolerable range - at least during the initial years - needs to be higher than 
that in the developed countries. 
It may, however, be noted that supply shocks may not necessarily lead to high inflation; they 
can reduce the rate of inflation as well. Inflation reducing supply shocks occur when 
technological progress makes the economy more efficient, or when competitive pressure in 
the economy increases. These changes are generally slow, so the fall in inflation is also 
likely to be slow. 
The Indian experience seems to be supportive of the existence of positive supply shocks as 
well. For example, studies like Poddar (2004) have found evidence that the liberalisation 
process in India had resulted in greater domestic competition, increasing firms’ efficiency and 
India’s ability to export in international markets. This increase in efficiency was achieved by 
combinations of monetary, fiscal, competition and administrative policies and not by 
monetary policies alone. One can argue that some of these policies initiated during the 
economic reforms led to a shift in the aggregate supply curve, giving rise to difficulties in 
estimating the likely contribution of monetary policy in the reduction of inflation. 
Although the precise contribution of monetary policy in reducing the rate of inflation is difficult 
to arrive at, monetary policy in India facilitated the process of raising competitiveness and 
efficiency. There is evidence that policies adopted by the RBI led to an increase in the 
efficiency and competitiveness of the financial sector. For example, Bhattacharya and Das 
(2003) have observed a clear downward trend in different measures of spreads in the 
banking sector in the 1990s. Further results in Prasad and Ghosh (2005b) pertaining to the 
period 1996-2004 suggest that Indian banks had operated during that period under 
competitive conditions. It is likely that the increase in competitiveness in the financial sector, 
inter alia, created the background for the increase in competition in other sectors by reducing 
entry and exit barriers. 
The next question that we ask is: whether the rate of inflation in India has fallen to the 
desired level? Arriving at a socially optimal rate of inflation is not an easy task. Interestingly, 
the Chakravarty Committee, while highlighting the importance of price stability as the 
dominant objective of monetary policy, considered the desirable rate of inflation in India to be 
about 4.0%. Rangarajan (2001), in the case of India, suggested an alternative acceptable 
range as 5.0 to 6.0%. The figures of both the Chakravarty Committee and Rangarajan (2001) 
are based on judgments, as it was felt that econometric models could not clearly indicate all 
the costs of inflation. Interestingly, in the case of India, empirical estimates of the threshold 
rate of inflation - beyond which it has a negative effect on growth - generally vary between 
3 and 7%, although the official estimate is about 5% (RBI (2002)).
26 
In the developed countries, the current desirable rate typically considered is around 
1.0-2.0%. If we allow a 2.0 percentage point band on either side, 0.0-4.0% seems to be the 
general tolerable range. Thus, since 1998-99 the average annual rate of inflation in India 
(measured in terms of WPI) has not been too much out of alignment with that in developed 
countries. It may be noted that in the Indian context, the rates of inflation based on WPI and 
CPI had sometimes yielded significantly different estimates and even their long-term 
relationships had been found to be susceptible (Samanta and Mitra (1998)). Incidentally, the 
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annual average rate of inflation in India based on CPI had been 5.1 during the same period, 
not much different from the estimates based on WPI. 
The next question that we ask is: had monetary policy in India been too tight in introducing 
these changes? Measuring monetary policy, despite the fundamental contributions of 
Bernanke and Mihov (1998), is not an easy task. This is especially difficult in the Indian 
context due to the interim shifts from quantity-based to price-based signals. 
The history of the 1990s at least indicates one episode where the criticism of “too tight” 
monetary policy merits scrutiny. The episode occurred during the year 1995-96, when the 
flexible exchange rate regime adopted during the early 1990s met its first test. The RBI was 
not committed to any specific values of the exchange rate, but consistently maintained its 
stand on fighting volatilities. A major test came when after a long period of remarkable 
stability the INR-USD rate depreciated substantially. 
During the first half of 1993, the rupee experienced some minor fluctuations against the US 
dollar. However, throughout the second half of 1993 and for the almost entirety of 1994-95, 
the rupee remained stable at 31.37. From September 1995 onwards, the INR-USD market in 
India experienced wide volatility. Such wide fluctuations continued until February 1996, and 
the value of the rupee against the US dollar fell as low as 37.40. However, the RBI 
intervention to stabilise the market was successful. By April 1996, the rupee stabilised at 
around 34.23. The RBI intervention in the foreign exchange market was one reason behind 
the so-called “liquidity crunch”. This “liquidity crunch” might have choked GDP growth in 
1997-98 to 4.8% from 7.8% in the year 1996-97. Studies like Srimany and Samanta (1998) 
have found evidence of tight monetary policy during October 1995 to March 1996. Some 
researchers like Balakrishnan (2005), citing the evidence of high real PLR during this 
episode, held the RBI responsible for the liquidity crunch, calling it a “bizarre case of no 
monetary policy”. 
Though questions may be raised whether the RBI had acted too cautiously, it may be noted 
that in a nascent market-driven economy, unwarranted volatility in the foreign exchange 
market could have created havoc. The Mexican crisis was still fresh and the RBI certainly 
needed to invest in credibility. It can be argued that though GDP growth for one single year 
suffered, successful management of the volatility in the foreign exchange market helped to 
establish the credibility of the RBI. This credibility was enhanced substantially after the 
successful handling of the Southeast Asian financial crisis. Thus, even if monetary policy had 
been “too tight”, the RBI action revealed a marked preference in favour of financial stability. 
Incidentally, 1995-96 is the year when the rate of inflation in India, after the high inflation 
episode of 1990-95, began to fall. 
A final important question is: how can the rate of inflation in India be reduced further and 
brought completely into line with that of the developed economies, and has monetary policy 
any role in this process? An examination of the figures relating to core inflation suggests that 
other than ensuring financial stability, monetary policy will have a limited additional role in 
this process. The task for aligning the rate of inflation further primarily rests on fiscal, 
administrative and competition policies that should orient more and more towards the micro 
level. 
The paper, in this context, highlights a specific aspect of inflation that has so far been 
ignored by the literature that addressed structural aspects of inflation formation in India. India 
being a large country, shocks to prices in a particular area could be local. Unfortunately, the 
WPI data that are used by the Indian monetary authorities for policy purposes cannot be 
used to examine this aspect. However, CPI data (for industrial workers) that are available for 
76 separate cities in India help us to assess the importance of this problem. 
In a recent study, Das and Bhattacharya (2005) have studied the features of the spatial 
distribution from 1996 to 2004. Some of the results that emerge from this study are startling 
and reveal that the range over which regional inflation rates vary could be as high as about 
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during the same year the average rate of inflation based on CPI was 13.4%. The standard 
deviations of the rate of inflation across regions generally varied between 2.0 and 
2.5 percentage points. Further, though in general the spatial distribution was found to be 
close to the normal distribution, in high inflation years, it tended to become skewed and 
leptokurtic, with an increase in standard deviation as well. This level of high spatial variation 
of inflation in India, despite a common monetary policy, highlights the importance of local 
supply shocks that monetary policy cannot address. Rather, if India opts for formal IT in the 
near future, the existence of significant local shocks in prices is one aspect that would also 
need further careful scrutiny. The key is to remove local monopolies and facilitate inter-
regional trade to the extent possible. 
4. Conclusion 
In our endeavour to understand the role of monetary policy and monetary frameworks in the 
light of the Indian experience, it is observed that monetary policy in India so far had largely 
been discretionary. The discretionary policies, at least during the 1990s, were unavoidable 
due to the immense structural changes that were required to transform a command and 
control economy to a market-based one. However, consistent with international trends during 
the 1990s, the motivations that led to such discretionary practices in India had generally 
been explained to economic agents in detail. Despite crucial differences in a few areas, the 
monetary policy framework in India has assimilated many of the best international practices. 
The RBI’s overall performance in transparency and data dissemination were also 
satisfactory. Its performance in assessing the outlook - in full view of public knowledge - had 
also been good and this perhaps helped to guide expectations of economic agents along the 
desired trajectory. Together these features indicate the adoption of a soft, informal and 
flexible version of the IT framework similar to that practiced by many economies before their 
formal switch to IT. The Indian experience, therefore, further strengthens the observation of 
Mishkin (1999) that rather than the formal adoption of a target, “the devil is in the details in 
achieving transparency and accountability”. 
While monetary policy played an important role in reducing the rate of inflation in India, the 
paper argues that this achievement was due to combinations of monetary, fiscal, competition 
and administrative policies. It may be noted that some of these policies, by enhancing 
efficiency and competition, usher shifts in the aggregate supply curve. As a result, to isolate 
the likely contribution of monetary policy in reducing the rate of inflation becomes a difficult 
task, especially in a situation where the relevant statistics pertaining to aggregate supply 
situations are unavailable. The paper, however, observes that even in this area, monetary 
policy in India played an important role. It facilitated the increase in efficiency and 
competitiveness in the overall economy by sharply focusing its attention on efficiency and 
competitiveness in the financial sector. 
A defining feature of the Indian approach to financial sector reforms is gradualism. This is in 
sharp contrast to some of the emerging market economies that adopted shock therapy. To 
quote Reddy (2005), policymakers in India had been engaged “in the development of sound 
and efficient financial intermediaries and markets so as to provide solid foundations for 
effective transmission of monetary policy”. So far as monetary policy is concerned, an 
important lesson in this context is that a careful demarcation of structural policy measures 
from typical stabilisation measures could be helpful. Common sense suggests that for 
financial stability, the second set of measures should be speedy, but a juxtaposition of the 
Indian experience to other emerging market economies seems to suggest that undue haste 
in initiating structural changes - while not necessarily bad - could be risky. 
It is this last observation that highlights the importance of perspectives in reviewing Indian 
performance. So far, the paper has consciously attempted to avoid the use of normative BIS Papers No 31  99
 
 
words like “good”, “bad”, “sound” or “desirable” in reviewing the actions of Indian monetary 
policymakers, as these words often reflect one’s strong normative preferences between high 
growth and financial stability. A striking contrast in perspectives in this context is worth 
mentioning. In describing the Indian experience, Reddy (2005) does not rule out “an element 
of luck”, but opines that investment in institution-building was an “exercise of sound judgment 
and enhancement of skills at all levels”. At the other extreme, Balakrishnan (2005) perceives 
the same experience as a “less than imaginative support to growth”, “a failure to show 
acceleration” and a “bizarre case of a missing monetary policy”, with a grudging approval that 
“this does not warrant the conclusion that the reforms failed”. Thus, like the proverbial story 
of the Indian elephant which would look different to different people, the actions of Indian 
policymakers would perhaps attract different adjectives from different persons or 
organisations. 
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